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Introduction 
The Vilnius Eastern Partnership Summit on 28-29th November represents a milestone in 
EU relations not just with respect to the six Eastern Partnership countries (EaP: Armenia, 
Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and particularly Ukraine), but also with the EU’s 
‘strategic partner’ Russia. The turbulence and numerous speculations regarding 
expectations about the signature of the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement (comprising a 
Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement – AA/DCFTA), as well as progress in 
initialling similar future agreements with Georgia and Moldova, have been escalating 
before the summit. The association agreements would bring EaP signatory countries 
closer to the EU: not really closer to EU membership, but closer to the application of 
various EU norms and standards (takeover of the ‘acquis communautaire’) and – 
significantly – out of the Russian orbit, for the beginning at least symbolically. The 
postponement of the EU-Ukraine AA/DCFTA signature – Ukraine’s government stopped 
the related preparations just one week before the summit – represents a serious setback 
for the EU while Russia has gained another strategic point, at least for a while.2 Though the 
EU has no ‘Plan B’ and EU High Representative Catherine Ashton expressed her 
disappointment immediately after Ukraine’s announcement, life will continue after the 
summit and new initiatives will have to be started.  
 
What are the relevant issues and challenges and what is at stake? This note briefly 
discusses the positions of the key individual parties (the European Union, Ukraine and 
Russia), presents details on foreign trade and tariff data  and attempts to evaluate the 
consequences (economic and otherwise) of alternate decisions following the Vilnius 
Eastern Partnership Summit. It also reviews some of the disputed arguments and 
discusses selected relevant economic issues. 
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  Ukraine’s government proposed to establish a tripartite commission with the EU and Russia in order to discuss jointly 
trade and economic issues – see www.gazeta.ru, 21 November 2013. The interruption of the AA/DCFTA process was 
presented as a ‘tactical decision’ driven solely by economic reasoning by Ukraine’s Prime Minister Mykola Azarov.  
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Tug-of-war over Ukraine 
In its present form, the conclusion and implementation of an AA/DCFTA between Ukraine 
and the EU has been presented by both the EU and Russia as incompatible with the 
participation of EaP countries in the Russian-led Customs Union (BRK-CU: other members 
being Belarus and Kazakhstan) and especially with Ukraine’s joining the envisaged 
‘deeper and wider’ post-Soviet integration project in the framework of the Eurasian Union 
and the Single Economic Space (SES).3 Until compromise solutions regarding tariff 
regimes have been negotiated, the two integration directions – either with the EU or a 
participation in the BRK-CU/SES – are indeed incompatible. The Russian ‘success’ to lure 
Armenia into the BRK-CU instead of opting for an AA/DCFTA with the EU announced on 
3rd September 2013 was initially interpreted by some in the EU as incompatible with 
Armenia’s prospective conclusion of an AA/DCFTA. Later on, European Commissioner for 
Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy Štefan Füle attempted to de-escalate the tensions 
and tried to dismiss such fears by stating in October at a conference in Kyiv that the 
AA/DCFTA should ‘not be seen as a threat but as an opportunity, a contribution to creating 
the area of free trade between Lisbon and Vladivostok’. Furthermore, he explained that the 
European Commission is ‘working on the issue of legal incompatibility between the 
Association Agreement and Customs Union’ while requiring once again from Ukraine to 
show ‘determined action’ and deliver ‘tangible progress on all European Union 
benchmarks’.4 Ukraine, for its part, would opt for signing the AA/DCFTA agreement (a 
corresponding decision was adopted by Ukraine’s government already in September 2013) 
while, ideally, desiring to ‘pick up the cherries’ and preferring to maintain and develop good 
relations with both Russian-led Customs Union and the EU. One of the EU’s key demands 
– to cease the application of ‘selective justice’ and in particular to release former Prime 
Minister Yulia Tymoshenko from prison – will obviously not be fulfilled, at least not before 
the Vilnius Summit.5 
 
 
Russia’s bullying pays-off 
Starting with Russia, there has been some history in this country’s use of economic 
sanctions in order to retaliate for perceived unwelcome political developments in the ‘near 
abroad’. Russian sanctions ranged from import bans on Georgian wine and mineral water 
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  See Füle (2013a, 2013b). The latter requirement was spelled out by Mr Füle in a speech before the Ukrainian 
parliament in Kyiv on the same day (Füle, 2013c).  
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  EU foreign affairs ministers reiterated conditions for signing the AA/DCFTA agreement at their meeting on 18 
November 2013 in Brussels as follows: ‘Determined action and tangible progress is needed in three areas: the 
compliance of the parliamentary elections with international standards, addressing the issue of selective justice and 
preventing its recurrence, and the implementation of the reforms jointly agreed in the Association Agenda’ 
(http://www.euractiv.com/specialreport-ukraine-way-reform/analysts-slam-germany-ukraine-po-news-531768). 
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in 2004-2006 after the ‘Rose Revolution’ in Georgia, the interruption of gas deliveries to 
Ukraine and Belarus related to disputes over pricing and access to pipelines, restricting 
imports of wine and spirits from Moldova, imposing import restrictions on dairy products 
and chocolate from Ukraine, on dairy products imports from Lithuania, etc.6 The latest sore 
point in Russian external relations with potentially severe economic consequences has 
been Russia’s concentrated efforts in bullying Ukraine (as well as Georgia and Moldova) 
related to the envisaged AA/DCFTA signature at the forthcoming Eastern Partnership 
Summit in Vilnius.7 The frequency and intensity of Russia’s rather crude attempts to 
prevent Ukraine from signing the AA/DCFTA prior to the Vilnius Summit and to ‘explain the 
adverse consequences of the signature’, together with simultaneous efforts to ‘lure’ 
Ukraine into joining the Russian-led Customs Union with Belarus and Kazakhstan, 
escalated before the Vilnius Summit.8 Repeatedly, Sergey Glazyev, one of President 
Putin’s economic advisors, lectured Ukraine on the alleged adverse consequences of 
signing the ‘discriminative’ AA/DCFTA agreement while simultaneously threatening with 
Russian sanctions. Indeed, Russian border controls on Ukrainian exports were briefly 
introduced (on a ‘trial’ basis, but still violating the CIS FTA agreements where Ukraine 
participates) while simultaneously praising the economic benefits of Ukraine’s joining the 
Customs Union. Similar warnings were spelled out by Russian Ambassador to the EU 
Vladimir Chizhov and reiterated, albeit in a more polite form, by Russian First Deputy 
Prime Minister Igor Shuvalov, who is in charge of EurAz economic relations in Russia.9 
Last but not least, the Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev warned his Ukrainian 
colleague Mykola Azarov that after signing the AA/DCFTA Ukraine will have ‘zero chances’ 
of a full-scale CU membership while Russian Foreign Affairs Minister Sergey Lavrov 
mentioned the possibility to tighten border controls between the two countries.10 The latest 
serious and immediate threat was expressed by Mr Medvedev at the beginning of 
November in connection with Ukraine’s payment arrears for Russian gas deliveries 
(amounting to nearly USD 900 million as of August 2013). Prime Minister Medvedev 
required a prompt debt repayment, rejected new Russian credit and required a pre-
payment for additional gas deliveries (which is envisaged by the existing contract with 
Gazprom) while suggesting that if needed Ukraine should ask the EU for financial 
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  See Moldova’s Foreign and European Integration Minister (who is also chief AA negotiator) Natalia Gherman at 
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 See http://www.euractiv.com/europes-east/top-envoy-russia-offer-ukraine-e-news-530890 and 
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(www.gazeta.ru/business/2013/10/15). For Lavrov’s speech see 
http://www.gazeta.ru/politics/2013/10/28_a_5727929.shtml. 
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assistance instead.11 Meanwhile Ukraine is squeezed also by the IMF which urges the 
government to reduce budgetary expenditures and to raise domestic gas tariffs, as well as 
to implement a number of other unpopular reforms before resuming new financing.12   
 
Russia’s bullying attempts to pressure its neighbours to ‘integrate’ with Russia instead of 
with the EU was seen as counterproductive not only by many Ukrainians and most outside 
observers, but even by a number of commentators in Russia.13 On the other hand, a 
negative view regarding the consequences of an AA/DCFTA signature is shared by 
Ukraine’s communists who claim – probably correctly – that the country has no perspective 
to join the EU in the next 20-30 years and that the implementation of EU regulations would 
be too costly while EU integration is allegedly supported by just 40% of Ukrainians.14 Last 
but not least, there have been tensions among current BRK-CU members as neither 
Belarus nor Kazakhstan – the two other members of BRK-CU – are particularly happy with 
the current Russian dealings related to the CU stance. For example, at the recent BRK-CU 
summit in Minsk (end-October 2013), Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev complained 
about the ‘excessive politicisation’ of the CU Commission’s decisions pursued by Russian 
representatives who are ‘not independent enough’ from the government (which contradicts 
CU Commission statutes). Furthermore, Belarus President Alexander Lukashenko 
complained at the same summit about increased bureaucratic obstacles in BRK-CU 
customs procedures and delays in other integration steps.15 On the sidelines, 
Mr Nazarbayev also suggested to invite Turkey to join the BRK-CU.16 
 
 
EU’s failed Eastern Partnership 
Following a number of resolute previous ‘either/or’ statements regarding direction of 
integration by various EU representatives, European Commissioner for Enlargement and 
Neighbourhood Policy  Štefan Füle attempted to de-escalate the situation while declaring 
that this issue ‘is not a choice between Moscow and Brussels’ and promised Ukraine a 
speedier AA/DCFTA implementation after Vilnius summit. Mr Füle also declared that the 
European Commission is ‘working on overcoming the issues of legal compatibility between 
the AA and CU’ in order to ‘prevent new walls in Europe’,17 and sharply rebuked claims 
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suggests that ‘acquis takeover’ is indeed costly and problematic (Havlik, 2003). 
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  See Mr Füle’s speech at the conference in Yalta, Ukraine, on 20 September 2013. 
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regarding the adverse effects of an AA/DCFTA.18 On the same day, Mr Füle announced a 
‘post-Vilnius agenda’ for Ukraine which would include financial assistance to support the 
implementation of the Association Agreement amounting to EUR 186 million and to move 
ahead with a macro-financial assistance of EUR 610 million, ‘once the conditions are in 
place’ (ibid). The current EU stance with respect to both Eastern Partnership countries and 
the ‘partnership for modernisation’ with Russia, as well as the lack of a corresponding 
longer-term strategy, have long been criticised by numerous observers and experts.19 
 
 
Economic integration effects 
Available studies dealing with the (economic) effects of alternative integration agreements 
provide widely conflicting results, depending on methods, assumptions and data sources. 
One of the common findings of these studies is that (economic) effects on Russia (or the 
EU for that matter) are asymmetric: they are rather small compared to effects on smaller 
prospective integration partners such as Ukraine, Armenia, Georgia or Moldova – owing to 
the sheer size of the Russian/EU economy (see, among others, Astrov et al., 2012; EDB, 
2012, 2013; Vinokurov and Libman, 2012; Dabrowski and Taran, 2012; Dreyer, 2012; 
Movchan and Shportyuk, 2012; EBRD, 2012). Another common finding of most integration 
studies is that (mostly short-term) tariff reduction effects are relatively small compared to 
the effects from the abolishment of non-tariff barriers and the expected medium- and long-
term efficiency gains from capital inflows and related restructuring. This applies not only to 
the post-Soviet integration or the AA/DCFTA but, for example, to the Transatlantic Trade 
and Investment Partnership (TTIP) under negotiation between the EU and USA as well 
(see Francois et al., 2013). 
 
Regarding the effects of alternative integration scenarios, there is a plethora of different 
evaluation approaches, applying various methodologies, assumptions and data sets (see 
references for a selection of the relevant literature). Not surprisingly, the evaluation results 
differ by wide margins and the issue – economic effects of alternate integration directions – 
is excessively politicised. Ukraine has so far rejected a full-fledged BRK-CU membership 
and acquired ‘observer status’ instead. Apart from tricky geo-political aspects, important 
reasons for Ukraine’s reluctant position are its WTO-related commitments and questions of 
BRK-CU compatibility with the prospective AA/DCFTA with the EU. While there seems to 
be little (economic) justification for Russia prompting Ukraine to join the BRK-CU 
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(economic impacts on Russia are rather small, partly owing to its size), for Ukraine, on the 
other hand, the economic (and other) linkages to Russia are rather important. 
 
Box 1 
What is the content of the EU-Ukraine DCFTA? 
The EU-UA DCFTA represents a part of the Association Agreement and consists of 15 Chapters, 14 
Annexes and 3 protocols – altogether more than 900 pages of text which was published in 
November 2012, and few experts have probably actually read it. According to Chapter 1 (Market 
Access for Goods) the vast majority of customs duties (99.1% by Ukraine and 98.1% by the EU) will 
be removed as soon as the Agreement enters into force after the ratification process is completed. 
Few sectors will obtain transition periods for removing customs duties (e.g. the automotive sector in 
Ukraine for 15 years and some agriculture products in the EU for up to 10 years); WTO rules will be 
generally applied to non-tariffs barriers. According to EC estimates, Ukrainian exporters will save 
EUR 487 million annually due to reduced EU import duties while Ukraine will remove around EUR 
390 million in duties on imports from the EU.20 Ukraine will progressively adapt its technical 
regulations and standards to those of the EU.21 Chapter 6 (which deals with services) aims at the 
expansion of the EU internal market ‘once Ukraine effectively implements the EU-acquis’. Similar 
wording is used in relation to financial services, telecom, postal and maritime services. Chapter 8 
(Public procurement) provides exceptions for the defence sectors in both Ukraine and the EU. For 
the first time, Ukraine’s DCFTA includes specific provisions on trade-related energy issues (Chapter 
11; Ukraine is already a member of the Energy Community Treaty which imposes an obligation to 
implement the EU energy acquis on electricity and gas). These include rules on pricing, prohibition 
of dual pricing and transport interruption to third countries as well as rules on non-discriminatory 
access to the exploration and production of hydrocarbons.22 Importantly, Protocol I of the DCFTA 
deals with rules of origin and defines the ‘economic nationality’ of products needed to determine the 
duties applicable to traded goods.23 Future EU-Ukraine relations will include EU-Ukraine summits 
and the Association Council with the power to take binding decisions. Last but not least, Article 39 of 
the agreement explicitly stipulates that the DCFTA ‘shall not preclude the maintenance or 
establishment of customs unions, free trade areas or arrangements for frontier traffic except insofar 
as they conflict trade arrangements provided for in this agreement’ and consultations regarding 
these matters will take place within the Trade Committee. 
Source: European Commission, DG Trade and Industry. For the English version of the text see  
EU Ukraine Association Agreement English - 
2012_11_19_EU_Ukraine_Association_Agreement_English.pdf published on 19 November 2012 (a 
concise summary was published on the European Commission DG Trade website on 26 February 
2013). 
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existing CIS-wide FTA where Ukraine is a member) and is used as an argument for the erection of trade barriers. 
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Notwithstanding the above incompatibilities which would have to be re-negotiated and 
doubtlessly leave room for compromises, the polarisation of Russian and EU standpoints 
regarding these issues is not only endangering future Russian-EU relations, but it is also 
counterproductive with respect to Ukraine which remains sandwiched between the two and 
would be ultimately adversely affected by EU-Russia frictions most. As far as foreign trade 
volumes are concerned, Russia and the EU are of about the same importance for Ukraine: 
Ukraine’s exports to each of the destinations amounted to some USD 17 billion in 2012. 
Russia accounted for 26% of Ukraine’s exports and the BRK-CU (together with Belarus 
and Kazakhstan) for 33% of Ukraine’s exports in 2012. The enlarged EU(28) accounted for 
25% of Ukraine’s exports in 2012 (see Annex for additional trade statistics). As regards 
imports, the situation is similar: 32% of Ukraine’s imports originated from Russia in 2012 
(and more than 40% from the BRK-CU), whereas imports from the EU(28) accounted for 
31% of the total. However, there are important structural aspects of Ukraine’s trade to 
either destination: the structure of exports to Russia is more ‘advanced’ since Ukraine’s 
exports of transport equipment and machinery play a much bigger role. Some Ukrainian 
estimates reckon with an additional export and GDP growth potential from exports to 
Russia especially in aircraft, shipbuilding and railway machinery industries.24 
 
With respect to the EU, Ukraine’s exports are specialised on vegetable products, mineral 
products (partly refined from Russian oil imports) and base metals. Ukraine’s imports from 
Russia are traditionally dominated by mineral products whereas imports from the EU 
consist mostly of chemicals, machinery and transport equipment (Figure 1).  
 
Russia and the EU are thus nearly equally important trading partners for Ukraine. From a 
purely trade importance point of view the either-or decision regarding the direction of 
Ukraine’s trade integration is rather meaningless: both directions are important. Restricted 
access to the Russian market – if trade barriers are introduced by Russia as a punishment 
in case of Ukraine’s ‘European integration’ choice – would hit a more advanced part of 
Ukraine’s economy (located largely in the eastern part of the country) immediately and 
disproportionally, irrespective of the fact that a large part of these exports may represent 
remnants of cooperation links from the Soviet past (and are largely not competitive on EU 
markets). A BRK-CU-oriented integration of Ukraine would help to maintain and develop 
existing technological cooperation linkages, though probably without much modernisation 
and restructuring pressures (unless Russia itself embarks on a more radical reform path). 
On the other hand, the implementation of the AA/DCFTA with the EU would bring benefits 
to Ukraine only in the medium and long run – especially regarding the expected pressure 
on modernisation and reforms which would eventually lead to a significant restructuring of 
the Ukrainian economy and higher FDI inflows. There is little doubt that the EU as a more 
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developed economy would introduce more competition, modernisation and reform 
pressures on Ukraine; the EU market is also much bigger than the Russian one.  
 
Figure 1 
Structure of Ukraine’s foreign trade (in % of total, year 2012) 
 
 
Note:  
I  Live animals, animal products;  
II  Vegetable products 
III  Animal or vegetable fats, oils, waxes, prepared edible fats 
IV  Prepared foodstuffs, beverages, tobacco and substitutes 
V  Mineral products 
VI  Products of the chemical or allied industries 
VII  Plastics and articles thereof, rubber and articles thereof 
VIII  Raw hides and skins, leather, furskins and arcticles, etc. 
IX  Wood and articles of wood, wood charcoal, cork, etc. 
X  Pulp wood, paper or paperboard (incl. recovered) and articles 
XI  Textiles and textile articles 
XII  Footwear, headgear, umbrellas, walking sticks, etc. 
XIII  Articles of stone, plaster, cement, ceramic products, glassware 
XIV  Natural or cultured pearls, precious stones and metals, etc. 
XV  Base metals and articles of base metal 
XVI  Machinery, mech. Appliances, electr. equipment 
XVII  Vehicles, aircraft, vessels and associated transport equipment 
XVIII  Optical, measuring, medical instrum., clocks, musical instr., etc. 
XX  Miscellaneous manufactured articles 
Source: State Statistics Committee of Ukraine; own calculations. 
0
5
10
15
20
25
I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX X XI XII XIII XIV XV XVI XVII XVIII XX
Exports to EU27 Exports to Russia
0
5
10
15
20
25
I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX X XI XII XIII XIV XV XVI XVII XVIII XX
Imports from EU27 Imports from Russia
67.2%
9 
As far as customs tariffs are concerned, Ukraine and Russia have formally a free trade 
agreement (with some important exceptions for agricultural products such as sugar) while 
in trade with the EU 70.6% of the value of Ukrainian agricultural products and 90.8% of the 
value of non-agricultural products were exported duty-free already in 2011. Russia faced 
similar tariff protection in the EU for agriculture products like Ukraine while nearly all 
Russian non-agricultural exports to the EU were duty-free (in value; in terms of the number 
of duty free-tariff lines, Ukraine’s agricultural products face greater trade barriers in the EU 
– see Table 1 and Annex). Ukraine’s (as well as Russian) exports face the highest tariff 
protection in dairy products, cereals, sugar, beverages and tobacco whereas industrial 
products generally enjoy more tariff protection in both Ukraine and Russia. In fact, average 
final bound duties in both Ukraine and Russia are very similar (except for animal products, 
beverages and tobacco, and wood and paper where Russian tariffs are higher and the 
harmonisation of tariff lines should not, given the negotiating will, pose a too big problem – 
with the above-quoted few exceptions, see Table 1). 
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Table 1 
 
Ukraine   Tariffs and imports by product groups         
  Final bound duties MFN applied duties  Imports  Differences in final bound duties AVG 
Product groups AVG Duty-free Max Binding AVG Duty-free Max Share Duty-free EU-RU EU-UA RU-UA 
  
  in %   in %   in %   in %  in % 
Animal products 13.0       0      20 100 11.0      9.0      20     0.5    15.0 0.3 10.4 10.1 
Dairy products 10.0       0      10 100 10.0        0      10     0.2       0 39.8 44.7 4.9 
Fruit, vegetables, plants 13.1    10.2      20 100 9.9     18.9      20     1.4    54.6 1.5 -2.9 -4.4 
Coffee, tea 5.8    35.4      20 100 5.8     35.4      20     1.3    42.0 -0.2 0.4 0.6 
Cereals & preparations 12.7     3.3      20 100 12.6      3.8      20     0.9    27.1 12.1 9.5 -2.6 
Oilseeds, fats & oils 10.7    11.0      30 100 8.3     20.1      30     0.9    89.9 -1.5 -5.1 -3.6 
Sugars and confectionery 17.5     0.6      50 100 17.5        0      50     0.3       0 18.3 13.5 -4.8 
Beverages & tobacco 7.9    25.7      64 100 12.2     26.2     424     1.2    23.9 -2.3 13.4 15.7 
Cotton 1.4    40.0       5 100 1.4     40.0       5     0.0    61.3 0 -1.4 -1.4 
Other agricultural products 7.6    23.9      20 100 5.5     45.2      20     0.5    19.3 -1.2 -3.5 -2.3 
Fish & fish products 3.7    61.7      20 100 2.6     68.2      20     0.7    68.0 3.4 7.2 3.8 
Minerals & metals 4.5    42.4      20 100 3.0     47.6      20    32.8    79.0 -6 -2.5 3.5 
Petroleum 1.5    72.0      10 100 0.9     84.3      10    13.7    97.3 -3 0.5 3.5 
Chemicals 5.1    16.1      10 100 3.2     39.3      65    12.7    55.4 -0.6 -0.5 0.1 
Wood, paper, etc. 0.4    95.8      10 100 0.3     95.8      10     3.1    99.1 -7 0.5 7.5 
Textiles 4.1    33.7      13 100 3.8     35.6      13     2.1    25.6 -1.3 2.4 3.7 
Clothing 11.4     1.0      12 100 11.3      1.1      12     0.6     0.1 -0.3 0.1 0.4 
Leather, footwear, etc. 7.2    14.9      25 100 5.4     27.0      25     1.9    20.3 -2.2 -3 -0.8 
Non-electrical machinery 4.2    38.7      12 100 2.1     51.3      10     8.8    62.4 -4.1 -2.5 1.6 
Electrical machinery 5.3    33.0      25 100 3.8     39.1      25     6.8    34.2 -3.8 -2.9 0.9 
Transport equipment 7.5    15.8      20 100 5.1     39.6      20     7.5    21.4 -4.8 -3.4 1.4 
Manufactures, n.e.s. 6.4    31.9      25 100 5.5     32.0      25     2.1    68.6 -5.9 -3.9 2 
Source: WTO; own calculations. 
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Conclusions: cooperation and integration, not confrontation 
The earlier (both positive and negative) integration experiences of the new EU Member 
States (NMS) may provide a useful reference point for Ukraine. NMS trade integration with 
the EU was advancing rapidly after they had signed association agreements and inflows of 
FDI to the region accelerated already before the EU accession. FDI inflows have brought 
new technologies, higher quality standards, and better know-how in management and 
marketing (Hunya, 2008). Last but not least, FDI inflows have facilitated access to EU 
markets and fostered modernisation; they even contributed to a revival of intra-NMS trade 
(Richter, 2011). FDI-induced modernisation was crucial also in raising the energy efficiency 
of the recipient countries’ economies (which remains an important challenge for Ukraine – 
see Astrov et al., 2012). In this way, the former COMECON countries have successfully 
restructured their industrial sector, which in many cases became competitive on the 
European scale and has been gaining global market shares (Havlik, 2008). But  the 
experience of the NMS in the recent crisis has also taught important lessons regarding 
negative effects of capital flows and integration – neither being a panacea with respect to 
growth and convergence (see, for example, Gligorov et al., 2012). 
 
In the case of Ukraine – unlike in the above-mentioned NMS countries – one important 
factor behind the success restructuring story, namely the ‘carrot’ of prospective EU 
membership, is missing and is unlikely to be in place any time soon. Theoretically, Ukraine 
(just as Russia) could still try to emulate these developments via closer EU integration – 
even without a formal accession anchor, as the Baltic States did in the early 1990s.25 The 
latter does not rule out that Ukraine maintains close economic links with Russia, e.g. via a 
preservation of the current free trade regime (albeit with exemptions and limitations). The 
BRK-CU members – and first of all Russia – should also advance their integration with the 
enlarged EU, at least to the stage of a free trade area. A closer EU-BRK-CU integration 
which would include Ukraine is a potentially preferred option in the future which, if 
accompanied by a parallel integration of other EaP countries, would lay the foundation for 
a broader Pan-European Economic Space and a wider Eurasian integration ‘from Lisbon 
to Vladivostok’. This could be part of the new inclusive strategy for the EU Eastern 
Partnership which would refrain from the strategic rivalry with Russia and revitalise the 
Partnership for Modernisation, especially in order to avoid trade wars and raising new walls 
in Europe (Samson, 2002; Havlik, 2010; Emerson, 2011a; Havlik, 2013; Wisniewski, 2013; 
etc.). 
 
Summarising, both Russia and the EU should abstain from counterproductive geopolitical 
games over the influence in the EaP region that have adverse consequences especially for 
the EaP countries concerned. EU-Russia negotiations should not be about Ukraine or 
                                                          
25
  It is questionable whether this incentive is sufficient for truly sustained reform efforts. WTO membership is definitely not 
a sufficient ‘reform anchor’ – see O. Havrylyshyn in Grinberg et al. (2008). 
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other EaP countries but involve the latter in the process. All parties should also 
continue/resume FTA negotiations – perhaps with a lesser and selective focus on costly 
harmonisations of norms and regulations. Last but not least, the progress in visa 
liberalisation procedures and other confidence-building measures should be decisively 
speeded up and here it is the EU which should deliver. Apart from confidence building 
measures, a closer integration of the enlarged EU, Russia and the Eastern Partnership 
countries – from ‘Lisbon to Vladivostok’ – would boost trade and investment thus fostering 
the badly needed economic growth and stability in Europe. 
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Statistical Annex 
 
Tables from the wiiw Handbook of Statistics. Countries in Transition 2013: 
 
Table A1 
Kazakhstan: Foreign trade by country groupings 
 
2000 2005 2009 2010 2011 2012* 
EUR mn 1)2)       
Exports, fob 
      
Total 9319 22371 30977 45387 62929 67249 
EU-28 2400 9034 15164 23203 30738 35364 
   EU-15 2181 7752 12705 20391 27253 30665 
Other countries 3) 6919 13337 15813 22185 32191 31884 
Imports, cif 
      
Total 5330 13939 20373 23440 26619 36021 
EU-28 1253 3453 5588 5482 5271 7270 
   EU-15 1074 2995 4805 4567 4355 6069 
Other countries 3) 4077 10486 14785 17958 21348 28752 
Trade balance 
      
Total 3989 8432 10604 21947 36310 31227 
EU-28 1147 5581 9576 17721 25467 28095 
   EU-15 1108 4757 7900 15824 22898 24597 
Other countries 3) 2842 2851 1028 4226 10843 3133 
       
Annual growth in % 
      
Exports, fob 
      
Total 72.6 38.3 -36.0 46.5 38.6 6.9 
EU-28 62.1 59.5 -27.0 53.0 32.5 15.1 
   EU-15 87.0 52.7 -32.1 60.5 33.7 12.5 
Other countries 3) 76.6 26.9 -42.7 40.3 45.1 -1.0 
Imports, cif 
      
Total 58.6 35.5 -20.9 15.1 13.6 35.3 
EU-28 26.9 22.6 -4.3 -1.9 -3.8 37.9 
   EU-15 29.1 25.9 -3.2 -5.0 -4.6 39.3 
Other countries 3) 71.8 40.4 -25.7 21.5 18.9 34.7 
       
Shares in % 
      
Exports, fob 
      
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
EU-28 25.8 40.4 49.0 51.1 48.8 52.6 
   EU-15 23.4 34.7 41.0 44.9 43.3 45.6 
Other countries 3) 74.2 59.6 51.0 48.9 51.2 47.4 
Imports, cif 
      
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
EU-28 23.5 24.8 27.4 23.4 19.8 20.2 
   EU-15 20.1 21.5 23.6 19.5 16.4 16.8 
Other countries 3) 76.5 75.2 72.6 76.6 80.2 79.8 
1) Officially registered trade. 
2) Values in EUR converted from USD to NCU to EUR at the average official exchange rate. 
3) Refers to total minus EU-28 from 2000. 
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Table A2 
Russia: Foreign trade by country groupings 
 
2000 2005 2009 2010 2011 2012* 
EUR mn 1)       
Exports, fob 
      
Total 111449 193709 216560 299354 371071 408182 
EU-28 60780 111619 116080 160210 192189 216319 
   EU-15 39870 80255 88564 121657 142915 164148 
Other countries 2) 50668 82090 100480 139143 178882 191863 
Imports, cif 
      
Total 36613 79190 120136 172579 219576 246447 
EU-28 14617 35375 53962 71947 91606 96044 
   EU-15 12044 29283 43287 56998 74154 79421 
Other countries 2) 21996 43815 66174 100632 127970 150403 
Trade balance 
      
Total 74836 114519 96424 126775 151495 161735 
EU-28 46164 76245 62119 88263 100583 120275 
   EU-15 27827 50972 45278 64659 68761 84727 
Other countries 2) 28672 38275 34306 38511 50912 41460 
       
Annual growth in % 
      
Exports, fob 
      
Total 63.0 32.6 -32.0 38.2 24.0 10.0 
EU-28 80.1 46.2 -36.4 38.0 20.0 12.6 
   EU-15 71.0 51.2 -34.2 37.4 17.5 14.9 
Other countries 2) 46.3 17.7 -26.2 38.5 28.6 7.3 
Imports, cif 
      
Total 28.9 30.3 -34.0 43.7 27.2 12.2 
EU-28 17.9 27.8 -32.0 33.3 27.3 4.8 
   EU-15 14.9 28.0 -32.3 31.7 30.1 7.1 
Other countries 2) 37.4 32.3 -35.5 52.1 27.2 17.5 
       
Shares in % 
      
Exports, fob 
      
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
EU-28 54.5 57.6 53.6 53.5 51.8 53.0 
   EU-15 35.8 41.4 40.9 40.6 38.5 40.2 
Other countries 2) 45.5 42.4 46.4 46.5 48.2 47.0 
Imports, cif 
      
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
EU-28 39.9 44.7 44.9 41.7 41.7 39.0 
   EU-15 32.9 37.0 36.0 33.0 33.8 32.2 
Other countries 2) 60.1 55.3 55.1 58.3 58.3 61.0 
1) Values in EUR converted from USD to NCU to EUR at the average official exchange rate. 
2) Refers to total minus EU-28 from 2000. 
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Table A3 
Ukraine: Foreign trade by country groupings 
 
2000 2005 2009 2010 2011 2012* 
EUR mn 1)       
Exports, fob 
      
Total 15764.6 27455.0 28457.9 38729.2 49129.8 53536.7 
EU-28 5215.2 8256.5 6820.9 9858.6 12945.4 13321.2 
   EU-15 2811.6 4578.1 3906.7 5474.5 6787.7 7371.1 
Other countries 2) 10549.4 19198.5 21637.0 28870.6 36184.3 40215.5 
Imports, cif 
      
Total 15097.7 28985.3 32571.0 45763.8 59340.2 65867.2 
EU-28 4378.8 9794.8 11067.9 14428.9 18536.3 20404.6 
   EU-15 3116.9 6755.8 7225.0 8921.6 11938.4 13168.3 
Other countries 2) 10718.9 19190.5 21503.1 31334.9 40803.9 45462.6 
Trade balance 
      
Total 667.0 -1530.3 -4113.1 -7034.6 -10210.4 -12330.5 
EU-28 836.4 -1538.3 -4247.1 -4570.3 -5590.9 -7083.5 
   EU-15 -305.3 -2177.7 -3318.3 -3447.1 -5150.6 -5797.2 
Other countries 2) -169.5 8.0 133.9 -2464.3 -4619.5 -5247.1 
       
Annual growth in % 
      
Exports, fob 
      
Total 44.8 4.4 -37.8 36.1 26.9 9.0 
EU-28 51.4 -7.3 -45.4 44.5 31.3 2.9 
   EU-15 41.2 -4.7 -40.7 40.1 24.0 8.6 
Other countries 2) 41.7 10.4 -35.0 33.4 25.3 11.1 
Imports, cif 
      
Total 35.6 24.2 -44.3 40.5 29.7 11.0 
EU-28 34.6 27.3 -44.0 30.4 28.5 10.1 
   EU-15 38.2 23.7 -42.7 23.5 33.8 10.3 
Other countries 2) 36.0 22.7 -44.4 45.7 30.2 11.4 
       
Shares in % 
      
Exports, fob 
      
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
EU-28 33.1 30.1 24.0 25.5 26.3 24.9 
   EU-15 17.8 16.7 13.7 14.1 13.8 13.8 
Other countries 2) 66.9 69.9 76.0 74.5 73.7 75.1 
Imports, cif 
      
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
EU-28 29.0 33.8 34.0 31.5 31.2 31.0 
   EU-15 20.6 23.3 22.2 19.5 20.1 20.0 
Other countries 2) 71.0 66.2 66.0 68.5 68.8 69.0 
1) Values in EUR converted from USD to NCU to EUR at the average official exchange rate. 
2) Refers to total minus EU-28 from 2000. 
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Table A4 
Kazakhstan: Exports to the top thirty partners  
 
 
2000 2005 2009 2010 2011 2012* 
 
 
      
Total exports, fob, EUR mn 1) 9319.0 22370.9 30977.2 45387.1 62928.6 67248.6 
Shares in % (ranking in 2012) 
      
Italy 1 10.41 15.05 15.48 15.89 17.17 17.77 
China 2 7.65 8.70 13.63 16.79 18.60 16.46 
Netherlands 3 2.57 3.15 5.15 6.90 7.58 8.43 
Russia 4 19.87 10.51 8.21 9.48 7.99 7.09 
France 5 0.18 9.57 7.83 7.36 6.18 6.52 
Austria 6 0.01 0.00 2.77 4.20 4.43 5.73 
Switzerland 7 5.15 19.78 6.18 2.05 5.66 5.69 
Canada 8 0.08 1.90 3.21 4.06 3.00 3.56 
Romania 9 0.01 1.65 1.95 2.13 2.59 3.51 
Turkey 10 0.71 0.56 1.83 2.05 2.94 3.13 
Ukraine 11 2.88 0.72 2.98 1.11 3.05 2.76 
United Kingdom 12 2.58 1.15 2.86 2.30 1.85 1.94 
Poland 13 0.64 1.32 1.93 2.02 1.49 1.87 
Israel 14 . . 2.60 2.12 1.62 1.78 
Germany 15 6.25 1.47 2.08 2.90 1.84 1.61 
Uzbekistan 16 1.51 0.87 2.06 1.82 1.35 1.36 
Portugal 17 . 1.14 0.64 1.22 1.30 1.18 
Spain 18 0.07 1.67 1.34 1.53 1.30 0.77 
Greece 19 0.01 0.50 1.26 1.65 0.66 0.76 
Kyrgyzstan 20 0.66 0.81 0.90 0.70 0.58 0.74 
Iran 21 2.31 3.18 2.96 1.81 1.23 0.70 
Japan 22 0.11 0.49 0.57 0.89 1.19 0.64 
Finland 23 0.79 0.64 1.04 0.45 0.67 0.60 
Tajikistan 24 0.60 0.54 0.56 0.43 0.41 0.54 
United States 25 2.38 2.39 1.42 1.46 1.17 0.46 
Bulgaria 26 0.02 0.00 0.42 0.28 0.55 0.41 
Azerbaijan 27 0.53 0.46 0.21 0.57 0.27 0.40 
Afghanistan 28 0.66 0.59 0.95 0.60 0.38 0.34 
Cyprus 29 0.02 1.03 . 0.01 0.10 0.26 
Korea Republic 30 0.41 0.67 0.30 0.39 0.32 0.25 
1) Officially registered trade. 
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Table A5 
Russia: Exports to the top thirty partners  
 
 
2000 2005 2009 2010 2011 2012* 
 
 
      
Total exports, fob, EUR mn  111449 193709 216560 299354 371071 408182 
Shares in % (ranking in 2012) 
      
Netherlands 1 4.22 10.19 12.07 13.59 12.13 14.64 
China 2 5.09 5.40 5.53 5.12 6.78 6.81 
Germany 3 8.95 8.17 6.20 6.46 6.61 6.78 
Italy 4 7.03 7.89 8.32 6.92 6.32 6.18 
Turkey 5 3.00 4.49 5.43 5.12 4.91 5.23 
Ukraine 6 4.87 5.14 4.59 5.83 5.90 5.18 
Belarus 7 5.40 4.19 5.54 4.55 4.82 4.68 
Poland 8 4.32 3.57 4.14 3.76 4.14 3.79 
Japan 9 2.68 1.55 2.40 3.23 2.83 2.97 
Kazakhstan 10 2.18 2.71 3.03 2.69 2.73 2.87 
United Kingdom 11 4.53 3.43 3.01 2.85 2.71 2.86 
Korea Republic 12 0.94 0.98 1.88 2.63 2.59 2.63 
United States 13 4.50 2.62 3.03 3.10 3.18 2.47 
Finland 14 3.01 3.17 3.04 3.06 2.55 2.29 
Switzerland 15 3.74 4.46 2.06 2.20 2.22 2.05 
France 16 1.85 2.53 2.89 3.13 2.88 2.01 
Latvia 17 1.58 0.49 1.37 1.48 1.43 1.70 
India 18 1.05 0.96 1.97 1.61 1.18 1.51 
Belgium 19 0.73 1.02 1.34 1.24 1.45 1.30 
Hungary 20 2.33 2.07 1.29 1.35 1.50 1.27 
Sweden 21 1.68 0.96 1.06 0.90 0.99 1.18 
Slovakia 22 2.06 1.32 0.98 1.15 1.37 1.17 
Greece 23 1.23 0.80 0.77 0.72 0.91 1.13 
Spain 24 1.04 1.17 0.96 1.02 1.19 1.09 
Lithuania 25 2.01 1.66 1.13 0.89 1.40 1.03 
Czech Republic 26 1.69 1.58 1.47 1.39 1.05 1.00 
Bulgaria 27 0.57 0.79 0.73 0.86 0.68 0.83 
Estonia 28 1.20 0.88 0.38 0.43 0.55 0.70 
Taiwan 29 0.39 0.60 0.26 0.45 0.41 0.63 
Egypt 30 0.44 0.43 0.60 0.48 0.45 0.61 
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Table A6 
Ukraine: Exports to the top thirty partners  
 
 
2000 2005 2009 2010 2011 2012* 
 
 
      
Total exports, fob, EUR mn 15764.6 27455.0 28457.9 38729.2 49129.8 53536.7 
Shares in % (ranking in 2012) 
      
Russia 1 24.12 21.88 21.40 26.12 28.98 25.62 
Turkey 2 5.96 5.92 5.36 5.89 5.48 5.36 
Egypt 3 1.52 2.33 2.55 0.43 1.95 4.21 
Poland 4 2.87 2.95 3.04 3.48 4.09 3.74 
Italy 5 4.38 5.53 3.09 4.69 4.44 3.60 
Kazakhstan 6 0.53 1.95 3.57 2.53 2.72 3.57 
India 7 1.15 2.15 2.90 0.97 3.31 3.33 
Belarus 8 1.87 2.60 3.17 3.69 2.81 3.27 
China 9 4.32 2.08 3.61 0.91 3.19 2.58 
Germany 10 5.09 3.75 3.14 2.92 2.58 2.39 
Spain 11 1.12 1.68 1.44 0.80 1.42 2.24 
Hungary 12 2.25 2.01 1.84 1.67 1.96 2.19 
Lebanon 13 0.42 0.30 1.75 0.58 1.99 2.07 
Iran 14 0.62 1.69 1.90 0.55 1.65 1.69 
United States 15 4.98 2.79 0.63 1.58 1.63 1.47 
Saudi Arabia 16 0.25 1.13 1.26 0.16 1.19 1.35 
Netherlands 17 0.95 1.51 1.50 1.10 1.22 1.21 
Moldova 18 1.21 1.98 1.75 1.39 1.28 1.20 
Israel 19 0.73 0.85 0.99 0.31 0.75 1.16 
Azerbaijan 20 0.28 0.85 1.38 1.19 1.04 1.11 
Czech Republic 21 1.30 1.10 0.86 1.22 1.23 1.03 
Slovakia 22 1.58 1.48 1.09 1.11 1.23 0.98 
Syria 23 1.10 1.96 1.90 0.36 1.35 0.84 
Bulgaria 24 2.62 1.59 1.00 0.88 1.10 0.83 
Romania 25 1.13 1.43 0.80 1.37 1.39 0.80 
United Kingdom 26 0.94 1.05 0.87 0.99 0.71 0.80 
France 27 0.77 0.58 1.11 0.93 0.83 0.80 
Georgia 28 0.26 0.58 1.00 1.03 0.96 0.79 
Jordan 29 0.31 0.53 1.20 0.20 0.66 0.78 
Turkmenistan 30 1.02 0.55 0.82 0.41 0.35 0.77 
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Table A7 
Kazakhstan: Imports from the top thirty partners  
 
 2000 2005 2009 2010 2011 2012* 
        
Total imports, cif, EUR mn 1) 5329.9 13939.0 20372.8 23440.1 26618.5 36021.2 
Shares in % (ranking in 2012) 
      
Russia 1 48.40 37.98 31.32 39.38 41.38 36.59 
China 2 3.00 7.21 12.56 12.73 13.55 16.08 
Germany 3 6.66 7.50 7.19 5.93 5.62 8.26 
Ukraine 4 1.61 4.87 7.50 4.37 4.68 6.33 
United States 5 5.50 6.94 4.90 4.24 4.63 4.60 
Italy 6 3.09 3.91 6.74 5.10 3.09 2.11 
Korea Republic 7 1.66 1.48 1.32 1.69 1.68 2.09 
Japan 8 2.09 3.45 2.24 1.80 1.74 1.97 
Turkey 9 2.86 2.30 2.01 1.99 1.97 1.74 
Uzbekistan 10 1.40 1.47 1.07 1.52 2.08 1.74 
Belarus 11 0.78 1.20 1.29 1.70 1.60 1.43 
France 12 1.50 1.68 1.62 1.60 1.86 1.41 
United Kingdom 13 4.43 2.44 2.47 2.34 1.42 1.30 
Poland 14 1.16 1.14 1.48 1.22 1.06 1.04 
Kyrgyzstan 15 0.60 0.68 0.41 0.53 0.65 0.79 
India 16 0.91 0.58 0.55 0.64 0.66 0.72 
Czech Republic 17 0.67 0.55 0.63 0.54 0.44 0.70 
Brazil 18 0.55 0.96 0.71 0.75 0.92 0.65 
Netherlands 19 1.30 0.81 1.12 0.97 0.79 0.62 
Austria 20 0.36 0.90 0.89 0.71 0.60 0.58 
Sweden 21 0.51 1.51 0.92 0.67 0.84 0.54 
Finland 22 1.14 1.14 1.09 0.67 0.67 0.54 
Spain 23 0.18 0.44 0.42 0.32 0.40 0.50 
Switzerland 24 1.08 1.16 0.55 0.58 0.42 0.48 
Canada 25 0.46 0.73 0.87 0.70 0.47 0.45 
Belgium 26 0.66 0.83 0.55 0.57 0.48 0.44 
Lithuania 27 0.19 0.16 0.38 0.35 0.27 0.41 
Turkmenistan 28 0.86 0.29 0.22 0.03 0.18 0.39 
Hungary 29 0.51 0.40 0.35 0.41 0.44 0.31 
Ireland 30 . . 0.23 0.27 0.28 0.27 
1) Officially registered trade. 
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Table A8 
Russia: Imports from the top thirty partners  
 
 2000 2005 2009 2010 2011 2012* 
        
Total imports, cif, EUR mn 36613 79190 120136 172579 219576 246447 
Shares in % (ranking in 2012) 
      
China 1 2.80 7.36 13.62 17.02 15.78 15.40 
Germany 2 11.51 13.45 12.69 11.66 12.32 12.09 
Ukraine 3 10.78 7.92 5.46 6.14 6.58 5.68 
Japan 4 1.69 5.91 4.33 4.48 4.91 4.95 
United States 5 7.95 4.62 5.48 4.85 4.77 4.83 
France 6 3.50 3.72 5.04 4.39 4.34 4.35 
Italy 7 3.58 4.47 4.72 4.39 4.38 4.24 
Belarus 8 10.95 5.79 4.01 4.35 4.48 3.56 
Kazakhstan 9 6.49 3.27 2.21 1.94 2.34 2.72 
United Kingdom 10 2.54 2.81 2.12 2.00 2.35 2.59 
Korea Republic 11 1.06 4.06 2.91 3.18 3.79 2.17 
Turkey 12 1.03 1.75 1.92 2.13 2.08 2.16 
Poland 13 2.11 2.78 2.52 2.55 2.18 2.13 
Netherlands 14 2.18 1.97 2.14 1.94 1.94 1.61 
Finland 15 2.83 3.14 2.36 2.00 1.85 1.51 
Spain 16 0.92 1.24 1.36 1.33 1.41 1.24 
Belgium 17 1.42 1.50 1.52 1.43 1.35 1.18 
Czech Republic 18 1.08 1.00 1.39 1.27 1.47 1.12 
Brazil 19 1.14 2.38 2.08 1.78 1.44 1.03 
Austria 20 1.24 1.23 1.23 1.08 1.02 0.99 
Sweden 21 1.37 1.88 1.22 1.25 1.32 0.94 
India 22 1.64 0.79 0.91 0.94 0.91 0.93 
Hungary 23 1.19 1.11 1.57 1.37 1.09 0.88 
Switzerland 24 0.80 0.89 1.17 1.05 0.97 0.86 
Vietnam 25 0.11 0.18 0.41 0.49 0.56 0.71 
Slovakia 26 0.31 0.51 1.08 1.09 0.97 0.66 
Denmark 27 1.02 0.93 0.82 0.74 0.67 0.63 
Canada 28 0.57 0.52 0.72 0.65 0.60 0.61 
Taiwan 29 0.26 0.50 0.55 0.67 0.67 0.60 
Norway 30 0.46 0.76 0.67 0.62 0.62 0.56 
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Table A9 
Ukraine: Imports from the top thirty partners  
  2000 2005 2009 2010 2011 2012* 
        
Total imports, cif, EUR mn 15097.7 28985.3 32571.0 45763.8 59340.2 65867.2 
Shares in % (ranking in 2012) 
      
Russia 1 41.74 35.54 29.13 36.54 35.27 32.39 
China 2 0.94 5.01 6.02 2.03 7.59 9.33 
Germany 3 8.13 9.36 8.48 7.58 8.31 8.04 
Belarus 4 4.31 2.60 3.73 4.23 5.10 5.99 
Poland 5 2.24 3.89 4.78 4.59 3.85 4.21 
United States 6 2.58 1.96 2.83 2.91 3.14 3.43 
Italy 7 2.48 2.85 2.51 2.29 2.43 2.64 
Turkey 8 1.15 1.68 2.10 2.14 1.79 2.31 
France 9 1.69 2.21 2.14 1.82 1.82 1.97 
Korea Republic 10 0.79 1.79 1.25 0.46 1.50 1.83 
Kazakhstan 11 2.96 0.52 4.48 1.26 2.03 1.77 
Czech Republic 12 1.17 1.64 1.37 1.23 1.43 1.47 
Japan 13 0.71 1.52 1.14 1.32 1.23 1.41 
Hungary 14 1.19 1.79 1.49 2.00 1.61 1.37 
United Kingdom 15 1.45 1.39 1.43 1.35 1.37 1.36 
Netherlands 16 1.05 1.28 1.49 1.38 1.44 1.33 
India 17 0.54 0.89 1.05 0.28 0.98 1.21 
Romania 18 0.35 0.59 1.07 1.12 1.36 1.10 
Lithuania 19 0.97 0.55 0.90 1.05 1.00 1.08 
Singapore 20 0.03 0.05 0.06 0.01 0.05 0.97 
Switzerland 21 1.55 0.70 0.96 0.84 0.96 0.90 
Spain 22 0.72 0.65 0.82 0.77 0.83 0.88 
Austria 23 1.33 1.27 1.35 1.15 0.86 0.87 
Belgium 24 0.97 0.87 1.02 0.97 0.80 0.84 
Slovakia 25 0.89 0.84 0.67 0.73 0.73 0.69 
Brazil 26 0.67 0.86 0.83 0.17 0.66 0.68 
Sweden 27 1.08 1.51 0.99 0.59 0.77 0.64 
Finland 28 0.69 0.97 0.93 0.71 0.63 0.57 
Indonesia 29 0.20 0.34 0.57 0.20 0.64 0.49 
Norway 30 0.32 0.35 0.57 0.43 0.33 0.45 
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Table A10 
Kazakhstan: Exports and imports by SITC commodity groups  
 
2000 2005 2009 2010 2011 2012* 
Exports 1)       
Total exports, fob, EUR mn 9319.0 22370.9 30977.2 45387.1 62928.6 67248.6 
Shares in %  
      
0  Food and live animals 6.7 2.2 3.5 3.1 1.8 2.9 
1  Beverages and tobacco 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 
2  Crude materials, inedible, except fuels 7.5 6.7 6.0 5.4 6.9 6.2 
3  Mineral fuels, lubricants and related materials 52.8 70.1 69.5 71.7 72.0 69.9 
4  Animal and vegetable oils, fats and waxes 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 
5  Chemicals and related products, n.e.s. 1.1 1.9 4.5 4.4 3.3 3.8 
6  Manufactured goods classified chiefly by material 26.9 16.7 13.7 13.0 13.7 14.0 
7  Machinery and transport equipment 2.2 1.2 0.9 0.6 0.8 1.4 
8  Miscellaneous manufactured articles 0.5 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.7 
9  Commodities not classified elsewhere in the SITC 2.0 0.7 1.5 1.5 1.1 1.0 
       
Imports 1) 
      
Total imports, cif, EUR mn 5329.9 13939.0 20372.8 23440.1 26618.5 36021.2 
Shares in %  
      
0  Food and live animals 7.1 5.7 6.8 8.0 8.7 7.8 
1  Beverages and tobacco 1.3 1.1 1.2 1.0 1.1 1.1 
2  Crude materials, inedible, except fuels 2.8 2.0 1.2 1.3 1.4 2.3 
3  Mineral fuels, lubricants and related materials 11.4 11.9 10.0 9.9 12.8 10.8 
4  Animal and vegetable oils, fats and waxes 0.8 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.4 
5  Chemicals and related products, n.e.s. 10.2 9.3 10.0 11.9 10.4 10.3 
6  Manufactured goods classified chiefly by material 18.8 21.6 26.5 18.1 17.3 19.7 
7  Machinery and transport equipment 39.7 41.5 37.0 40.3 35.8 38.0 
8  Miscellaneous manufactured articles 6.4 6.5 6.8 9.0 11.8 9.4 
9  Commodities not classified elsewhere in the SITC 1.4 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.4 
1) Officially registered trade. 
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Table A11 
Russia: Exports and imports by SITC commodity groups  
 
2000 2005 2009 2010 2011 2012* 
Exports        
Total exports, fob, EUR mn 111449 193709 216560 299354 371071 408182 
Shares in %  
      
0  Food and live animals 0.9 1.3 2.5 1.6 1.8 2.5 
1  Beverages and tobacco 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.2 
2  Crude materials, inedible, except fuels 4.5 4.4 3.1 3.1 3.3 2.4 
3  Mineral fuels, lubricants and related materials 50.6 61.8 63.0 65.6 67.0 70.3 
4  Animal and vegetable oils, fats and waxes 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.2 0.4 
5  Chemicals and related products, n.e.s. 6.0 4.2 4.1 4.0 4.2 4.7 
6  Manufactured goods classified chiefly by material 17.8 14.8 12.3 11.2 9.8 9.5 
7  Machinery and transport equipment 6.2 4.1 3.6 2.8 2.3 2.7 
8  Miscellaneous manufactured articles 2.0 0.8 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.6 
9  Commodities not classified elsewhere in the SITC 11.8 8.4 10.1 10.8 10.8 6.6 
       
Imports 
      
Total imports, cif, EUR mn 36613 79190 120136 172579 219576 246447 
Shares in %  
      
0  Food and live animals 15.6 12.8 13.1 11.6 10.1 10.2 
1  Beverages and tobacco 3.3 2.4 1.7 1.5 1.3 1.4 
2  Crude materials, inedible, except fuels 7.2 3.7 3.0 2.2 2.1 2.2 
3  Mineral fuels, lubricants and related materials 4.1 1.6 1.4 1.2 1.6 1.3 
4  Animal and vegetable oils, fats and waxes 1.1 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.5 
5  Chemicals and related products, n.e.s. 11.8 12.7 13.1 12.8 11.7 12.1 
6  Manufactured goods classified chiefly by material 13.9 13.0 11.5 11.9 11.6 12.8 
7  Machinery and transport equipment 24.5 39.9 37.1 39.0 41.9 31.5 
8  Miscellaneous manufactured articles 7.2 7.0 10.2 11.0 10.0 11.3 
9  Commodities not classified elsewhere in the SITC 11.2 6.2 8.0 8.2 9.1 16.7 
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Table A12 
Ukraine: Exports and imports by SITC commodity groups  
 
2000 2005 2009 2010 2011 2012* 
Exports       
Total exports, fob, EUR mn 15764.6 27455.0 28457.9 38729.2 49129.8 53536.7 
Shares in %  
      
0  Food and live animals 1) 6.3 10.3 16.8 12.2 11.7 17.4 
1  Beverages and tobacco  . . . . . . 
2  Crude materials, inedible, except fuels 12.7 7.2 9.6 10.4 11.0 10.3 
3  Mineral fuels, lubricants and related materials 5.5 9.8 5.4 7.1 8.3 5.3 
4  Animal and vegetable oils, fats and waxes 1.6 1.7 4.4 5.0 4.8 6.0 
5  Chemicals and related products, n.e.s. 9.0 9.0 6.2 6.7 7.9 7.3 
6  Manufactured goods classified chiefly by material 45.6 44.1 36.1 37.1 33.3 28.8 
7  Machinery and transport equipment 12.3 12.6 16.6 17.3 12.9 14.4 
8  Miscellaneous manufactured articles 4.5 3.8 4.0 3.5 3.0 2.8 
9  Commodities not classified elsewhere in the SITC 2.4 1.6 0.8 0.7 7.1 7.6 
       
Imports 
      
Total imports, cif, EUR mn 15097.7 28985.3 32571.0 45763.8 59340.2 65867.2 
Shares in %  
      
0  Food and live animals 1) 5.9 6.5 9.5 8.2 6.3 7.2 
1  Beverages and tobacco  . . . . . . 
2  Crude materials, inedible, except fuels 5.6 3.9 3.4 3.7 2.8 2.6 
3  Mineral fuels, lubricants and related materials 43.0 29.5 32.2 32.3 34.6 30.9 
4  Animal and vegetable oils, fats and waxes 0.3 0.5 0.7 0.7 0.5 0.4 
5  Chemicals and related products, n.e.s. 8.8 11.7 15.3 14.3 11.9 12.1 
6  Manufactured goods classified chiefly by material 12.8 14.6 13.7 14.4 12.5 11.6 
7  Machinery and transport equipment 17.5 25.0 18.5 19.6 16.6 19.5 
8  Miscellaneous manufactured articles 3.6 5.4 5.8 6.0 3.9 5.1 
9  Commodities not classified elsewhere in the SITC 2.6 2.9 0.9 1.0 11.0 10.4 
1) Including beverages and tobacco. 
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Table B1 
 
Russian Federation  
 
      
Part A.1   Tariffs and imports: Summary and duty ranges       
Summary 
  Total Ag Non-Ag   WTO member since     2012 
Simple average final bound     7.8  11.2  7.2   Binding coverage: 
 
Total 100 
Simple average MFN applied 2012  10.0  13.3  9.4  
 
Non-Ag 100 
Trade weighted average 2011  9.9  16.7  8.8   Ag: Tariff quotas  (in %) 
  
  3.2 
Imports in billion US$ 2011  277.6  37.4  240.2    Ag: Special safeguards (in % )   0 
                      
Frequency distribution  Duty-free 0 <= 5 5 <= 10 10 <= 15 15 <= 25 25 <= 50 50 <= 100 > 100 NAV Tariff lines and import values (in %)  in % 
Agricultural products   
       
  
 Final bound       3.0    43.3    21.5    24.5     4.2     0.8     2.3     0.3    22.9 
MFN applied 2012      8.2    36.9     7.8    30.2    10.7     3.8     2.1     0.3    28.2 
Imports 2011      9.0    24.8     7.2    27.9    18.6     8.0     4.4     0.0    54.7 
 Non-agricultural products 
       
  
 Final bound       3.4    50.0    30.4    14.9     1.2     0.1     0.0       0     7.0 
MFN applied 2012     14.2    34.4    19.9    20.6     8.9     1.5     0.3     0.1    10.1 
Imports 2011     32.6    21.9    17.8    12.9     8.5     6.0     0.1     0.0     9.6 
Part A.2   Tariffs and imports by product groups         
  Final bound duties MFN applied duties  Imports  
Product groups AVG Duty-free Max Binding AVG Duty-free Max Share Duty-free 
  
  in %   in %   in %   in %  in % 
Animal products 23.1     7.4      80 100 23.7     14.8      90     2.5     3.6 
Dairy products 14.9       0      21 100 18.4        0      50     0.8       0 
Fruit, vegetables, plants 8.7     0.2      45 100 11.7      4.6     134     4.1     8.6 
Coffee, tea 6.4     4.2      13 100 9.1     20.8      23     1.1    34.1 
Cereals & preparations 10.1     1.3      77 100 12.9      3.5      77     0.9     1.6 
Oilseeds, fats & oils 7.1     8.2      25 100 8.5     10.9      48     0.8    22.1 
Sugars and confectionery 12.7       0      48 100 12.9        0      39     0.7       0 
Beverages & tobacco 23.6       0     292 100 29.2      5.2     292     1.6     2.7 
Cotton 0.0   100.0       0 100 0.0    100.0       0     0.1   100.0 
Other agricultural products 5.3       0      10 100 5.6      7.4      20     0.8     7.0 
Fish & fish products 7.5       0      77 100 12.4      0.4      77     0.9     2.6 
Minerals & metals 8.0     0.1      20 100 9.9      6.4      90     9.5    12.8 
Petroleum 5.0       0       5 100 4.5     10.0       5     1.1     1.3 
Chemicals 5.2     0.4      10 100 6.4      5.8      21    13.8    13.2 
Wood, paper, etc. 7.9     5.0      15 100 12.8      6.1      30     3.3     9.8 
Textiles 7.8       0      18 100 10.9      0.6      37     2.1     2.7 
Clothing 11.8       0      42 100 19.6        0     100     2.4       0 
Leather, footwear, etc. 6.4       0      15 100 10.3      8.7     176     3.2     7.7 
Non-electrical machinery 5.8     7.9      15 100 3.4     66.2      21    18.7    73.6 
Electrical machinery 6.2    23.3      16 100 7.3     25.2      27    11.1    37.8 
Transport equipment 8.9     2.5      20 100 10.6     17.7      35    16.1    29.9 
Manufactures, n.e.s. 8.4     7.9      20 100 11.4     17.2     190     4.4    39.7 
26 
Part B   Exports to major trading partners and duties faced       
Major markets 
Bilateral imports Diversification MFN AVG of Pref. Duty-free imports 
  in million 95% trade in no. of traded TL margin TL Value 
  US$ HS 2-digit HS 6-digit Simple Weighted Weighted in % in % 
Agricultural products   
 
  
 
  
  
  
  1. Kazakhstan                             2011  1,569 22  120      20.8     24.5     24.5 100.0  100.0  
2. European Union                         2011  1,510 22  55      14.6      7.9      1.3 21.8  67.7  
3. Egypt                                  2011  1,386 2  2     112.0      0.5      0.0 25.0  97.4  
4. Turkey                                 2011  863 6  13      29.5     85.4      0.0 14.2  3.7  
5. Ukraine                                2011  679 12  49       9.8     10.4      8.8 96.1  80.8  
Non-agricultural products 
 
  
 
  
  
  
  1. European Union                         2011  241,503 16  62       4.1      0.3      0.2 69.5  97.1  
2. China                                  2011  40,298 18  46       7.7      1.4      0.0 17.1  73.3  
3. United States                          2011  33,383 19  49       2.3      0.2      0.1 87.7  33.4  
4. Ukraine                                2011  28,386 45  347       3.7      0.9      0.9 100.0  100.0  
5. Belarus                                2011  23,958 50  540       9.5      3.3      3.3 100.0  100.0  
Source: WTO (http://stat.wto.org/TariffProfiles/). 
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Table B2 
 
Ukraine 
   
      
Part A.1   Tariffs and imports: Summary and duty ranges       
Summary 
  Total Ag Non-Ag   WTO member since     2008 
Simple average final bound     5.8  11.0  5.0   Binding coverage: 
 
Total 100 
Simple average MFN applied   2012  4.5  9.5  3.7  
 
Non-Ag 100 
Trade weighted average   2011  2.7  9.1  2.2   Ag: Tariff quotas  (in %) 
 
  0.1 
Imports in billion US$   2011  82.2  5.8  76.3    Ag: Special safeguards (in % )   0 
                      
Frequency distribution  Duty-free 0 <= 5 5 <= 10 10 <= 15 15 <= 25 25 <= 50 50 <= 100 > 100 NAV Tariff lines and import values (in %)  in % 
Agricultural products   
       
  
 Final bound      12.6    19.6    27.5    13.9    25.5     0.8     0.1       0     1.0 
MFN applied 2012     21.1    22.0    26.3    12.1    17.5     0.8     0.2     0.1       0 
Imports 2011     39.3    20.4    28.4     5.8     1.6     3.8     0.7     0.0       0 
 Non-agricultural products   
       
  
 Final bound      33.8    16.8    43.0     5.8     0.5       0       0       0     0.0 
MFN applied 2012     43.1    29.9    21.3     5.4     0.3       0     0.0       0       0 
Imports 2011     66.4    18.1    14.7     0.9     0.1       0       0       0       0 
Part A.2   Tariffs and imports by product groups         
  Final bound duties MFN applied duties  Imports  
Product groups AVG Duty-free Max Binding AVG Duty-free Max Share Duty-free 
  
  in %   in %   in %   in %  in % 
Animal products 13.0       0      20 100 11.0      9.0      20     0.5    15.0 
Dairy products 10.0       0      10 100 10.0        0      10     0.2       0 
Fruit, vegetables, plants 13.1    10.2      20 100 9.9     18.9      20     1.4    54.6 
Coffee, tea 5.8    35.4      20 100 5.8     35.4      20     1.3    42.0 
Cereals & preparations 12.7     3.3      20 100 12.6      3.8      20     0.9    27.1 
Oilseeds, fats & oils 10.7    11.0      30 100 8.3     20.1      30     0.9    89.9 
Sugars and confectionery 17.5     0.6      50 100 17.5        0      50     0.3       0 
Beverages & tobacco 7.9    25.7      64 100 12.2     26.2     424     1.2    23.9 
Cotton 1.4    40.0       5 100 1.4     40.0       5     0.0    61.3 
Other agricultural products 7.6    23.9      20 100 5.5     45.2      20     0.5    19.3 
Fish & fish products 3.7    61.7      20 100 2.6     68.2      20     0.7    68.0 
Minerals & metals 4.5    42.4      20 100 3.0     47.6      20    32.8    79.0 
Petroleum 1.5    72.0      10 100 0.9     84.3      10    13.7    97.3 
Chemicals 5.1    16.1      10 100 3.2     39.3      65    12.7    55.4 
Wood, paper, etc. 0.4    95.8      10 100 0.3     95.8      10     3.1    99.1 
Textiles 4.1    33.7      13 100 3.8     35.6      13     2.1    25.6 
Clothing 11.4     1.0      12 100 11.3      1.1      12     0.6     0.1 
Leather, footwear, etc. 7.2    14.9      25 100 5.4     27.0      25     1.9    20.3 
Non-electrical machinery 4.2    38.7      12 100 2.1     51.3      10     8.8    62.4 
Electrical machinery 5.3    33.0      25 100 3.8     39.1      25     6.8    34.2 
Transport equipment 7.5    15.8      20 100 5.1     39.6      20     7.5    21.4 
Manufactures, n.e.s. 6.4    31.9      25 100 5.5     32.0      25     2.1    68.6 
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Part B   Exports to major trading partners and duties faced     
Major markets 
Bilateral imports Diversification MFN AVG of Pref. Duty-free imports 
  in million 95% trade in no. of traded TL margin TL Value 
  US$ HS 2-digit HS 6-digit Simple Weighted Weighted in % in % 
Agricultural products   
 
  
 
  
  
  
  1. European Union                         2011  3,627 15  25      13.7      4.5      0.9 27.3  70.6  
2. Russian Federation                     2011  2,093 17  77      15.6     20.9     20.9 99.7  100.0  
3. Turkey                                   2011  1,183 4  11      30.6     46.7      0.0 12.7  2.2  
4. Egypt                                    2011  997 3  5       4.6      0.2      0.0 24.3  95.3  
5. India                                    2011  903 1  1      40.2      2.2      0.0 15.6  95.9  
Non-agricultural products   
 
  
 
  
  
  
  1. Russian Federation                     2011  17,846 45  514       9.6      7.9      7.9 100.0  100.0  
2. European Union                         2011  14,866 37  249       4.0      0.9      0.6 71.5  90.8  
3. Turkey                                   2011  3,564 14  50       5.0      7.3      0.7 66.1  39.6  
4. China                                    2011  3,174 11  17       8.0      0.9      0.0 16.1  77.7  
5. Belarus                                  2011  1,615 43  477       9.4      7.3      7.3 100.0  100.0  
Source: WTO (http://stat.wto.org/TariffProfiles/). 
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